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e ne 
any US industries have felt the heavy hand of 
deregulation over the past twenty years; tele- 
phones, airlines, trucking and natural gas to 
name a few. However, electric power was long 
felt to be too much a “natural monopoly” to face the deregula- 
tion process. Well, those days are over.. . 
The electric power industry is undergoing major changes, 
fig. I Power system structure 
both politically and technically. They are a result of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Orders 888 and 889 
issued in 1996. These orders essentially deregulate the transmis- 
sion network, allowing producers and customers access to the 
network for electricity transactions. 
One justification for this deregulation is to level the consid- 
erable differences in price of a kWh (lulowatt-hour) of electri- 
cal energy across the United States and Canada. Average 
residential costs vary from 5.0 cents per kwh in Washington 
state to 13.6 cents per kwh in New York. what is overlooked, 
however, is that this cost is not just for generating the electrici- 
ty. Currently, a considerable excess of power exists in the US 
The cost differences primarily lie in transmitting this power 
from its origin to the place of demand. 
How it has been working 
To better understand the effect deregulation will have on the US 
power system, we must look at how electric utilities currently 
operate. A typical power system confguration is shown in Fig. 
1. In current and past operations, the utilities were vertically 
integrated as shown by the dashed box. A single utility would 
own and operate all components necessary for providing service 
to their customers, from generation, through transmission, down 
to the distribution system. Customers received one bill from 
their utility company for the entire service. Historically, a single 
utility would service a geographic region. The utility was respon- 
sible for providing enough generation to meet all of their cus- 
tomers’ needs. However, after the infamous New York City 
L-power 
blackout of 1965, utilities began to interconnect. 
Interconnection yielded many advantages. 
Reliability was improved since neighboring 
systems could act as buffer zones and provide 
additional power during fault conditions. Many 
power companies worked cooperatively togeth- 
er to avert power failures. 
Additionally, utilities would buy and sell 
power across the interconnections, or tie lines. 
Frequently, a utility would produce excess power 
and sell it at a cheaper price than a neighbor could 
produce it. Thus, both companies profited from 
this arrangement. Currently, the flow of electric 
power through parts of the network is closely 
coordinated between utilities. For many decades, 
it was felt that having a single company own a 
region’s transmission and distribution systems 
and generation, under tight regulation, was more 
efficient than competition. 
How things will change 
Deregulation will essentially turn the dashed 
boxes in Fig. 1 on their sides. As deregulation 
proceeds, these entities will no longer exist in 
close collaboration within a single utility. Indeed, 
it is forecasted that distinct industries may arise 
which specialize in only one of these areas: a 
GenCo. (generation), a TransCo. (transmission), 
or a Disco. (distribution). Competition will 
replace cooperation. Competition, however, will 
How is this deregulation being accomplished? 
The new FERC orders have forced utilities to 
give “open access” to their transmission system 
to both suppliers of power and consumers. What 
this means is that, like the sidewalk in front of 
your house, anyone who chooses to may use it. 
And, secondly, consumers are no longer con- 
strained to purchase their power from the region- 
al utility. They can shop around for the best price. 
These two initiatives, taken together, will change 
the face of how electric power has traditionally 
been produced and transmitted. 
The impact on the network will be that cer- 
tain transmission corridors may be forced to 
carry more power than they were designed 
for. The results will be a myriad of technical 
difficulties such as decreased reliability (abili- 
ty to serve the demand), decreased power 
quality (harmonics and transients), and 
increased wear and tear on system equipment. 
An excellent example are the blackouts that 
affected western US and Canada in July and 
August of 1996. Both blackouts were exacer- 
bated by unscheduled power flows along the 
North-South coastal corridors. 
spur technological growth. 
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For example, in August 1996, California was suffering through a 
heat wave. Large amounts of electric power were shipped along 
two parallel tie h e s  (one AC and one DC line) from the north- 
west, south to the heavily populated areas of California. Howev- 
er, since electrical current will take the path of least impedance, 
not all of the current flowed through the desired corridor. As 
some current took a circuitous route (called a “loop flow”), the 
transmission lines over which the extraneous power flowed 
began to overload. This happened because they were not 
designed to carry such large amounts of current. 
As they overloaded, they began to heat up due to the large 
amount of FR (resistive) losses. As they heated up, the lines 
expanded and began to sag. Finally, one line sagged enough to 
make contact with a tree, thus causing a short circuit to ground. 
As this line was removed from service, the current was then 
shunted in greater amounts over the remaining lines, causing 
more overloads. This process continued until a cascade of cause 
and effects caused the systems to break apart, or “island” in order 
to retain coverage to as many customers as possible. While this 
caused a catastrophic failure, there are many more similar close 
calls that do not receive media attention. 
Cooperation vs revenues 
To better visualize this phenomenon, consider Fig. 2a. This 
shows two systems connected via two tie lines. Under normal 
operation, the two generators of system A provide power to the 
load (all loads are denoted by-) within the system over its own 
lines. The same holds for system B. There is no net interchange 
on the tie lines between A and B. However, if system A loses 
one of its internal lines as shown in Fig. 2b, power will inadver- 
tently flow over the lines of system B. 
There are several ramifications here. First, system B now has 
the burden of the excess wear and tear on the network equipment. 
In addition, system B cannot make any transactions that would 
increase the loading on its line any more. So, from the cooperative 
standpoint, the reliability of the system has been increased, since 
system A was able to maintain service. However, from the com- 
petitive standpoint, system B has lost system capacity, and there- 
fore potential revenues. 
The F%RC orders have required systems to place a dollar fig- 
ure on each transmission corridor, so utilities may charge for 
such transgressions. Utilities are required to post these costs and 
their predicted available transfer capacity on a World Wide Web 
site called OASIS. These costs must cover not only the actual 
cost of transmission, but also such intangibles as wear and tear, 
security capacity limits, and decreased reliability of service. 
What will happen 
Predicting available transfer capacity is an extremely m c u l t  task. 
In any given transfer of power, most of the power will flow over 
the predicted corridor. However, there is always a finite amount of 
power that will take a more circuitous route. Utilities, whose net- 
work this power flows over, will want to charge for the usage of 
their lines. Thus, they are working to improve their data collection 
and processing. 
More serious, though, is that transmission lines have limits. 
Transfer capacity is govemed by a number of factors, not just 
physical current carrying capacity. There are limits which are 
imposed by stability constraints. Too much power across a particu- 
lar line could result in generators pulling out of synchronism. This 
is manifested by large oscillations in power. Or a phenomenon 
called voltage collapse can result; the voltage in the system slowly 
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declines until it suddenly drops, with little or no warning. The 
power system will be pushed to the limits of its capability. Unfor- 
tunately, this limit is not usually known ahead of time. 
Results that will require attention 
Obviously, first off, better prediction and detection of these stabil- 
ity limits is going to be required under deregulation. Another cure 
for the woes the public is about to face is to add more transmis- 
sion capacity. 
This solution, however, will not typically be a viable option. 
Recent bids to add more tsdnsmission have met public and Environ- 
mental Protection Agency (ITA) resistance. Most of the public lives 
with a “not in my backyard” mentality when it comes to transmis- 
sion lines. There is also the concem over deleterious effects from 
things such as electromagnetic fields. Many utilities will be leery 
about undertaking such a major capital cost endeavor as well. 
The charge consumers see on their monthly bills is not only 
the actual cost of generation, but also the amortized cost of past 
investments in infrastructure. Few utilities are going to invest in 
new equipment when that cost will be added to the price they will 
have to charge. This amortized cost of equipment has left many 
utilities with “stranded assets.” These are assets, such as nuclear 
power plants which cost billions of dollars to build. Those costs 





Fig. 2 Loop flow between WO systems 
investments are paid off, the cost of electricity from that company 
will not drop. Even though, for example, nuclear power is one of 
the cheapest generation per kwh available. Many utilities fear that 
they will be unable to pay for these large past expenditures, since 
customers will abandon them for a cheaper competitor. 
A similar argument can be made about pollution. Strict clean 
air standards in heavily populated areas, such as the northeast and 
California, have forced coal-fired plants to be fitted with expensive 
filters, or “scrubbers.” These expenditures, too, have been factored 
into the companies’ price rates. However, under deregulation, con- 
sumers in these areas could contract with producers in the mid- 
west, who do not have to abide by the same strict standards, to 
generate their power. (But shipping this power over long distances 
still leads to the difficulties in transmission discussed previously.) 
These are all political and technical challenges yet to be solved. 
There is a world of opportunity out there for power engineers will- 
ing to tackle some of these problems. The US grid will certainly 
face growing pains, and probably a short term decrease in reliabili- 
ty. However, solutions to make the system more economic and 
reliable than before are sure to come about. 
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